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"INTERNET-SAVVY STUDENTS" AND
BEWILDERED EDUCATORS: STUDENT INTERNET
SPEECH IS CREATING NEW LEGAL ISSUES FOR
THE EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY
Caitlin May+
Approximately 87% of juveniles between the ages of twelve and seventeen
use the Internet,' and approximately 64% of teens create some form of online
content, such as a blog, website, or social-networking site.2 Most juveniles'
Internet speech occurs in the privacy of their homes; however, more and more
of this Internet speech is impacting the school community. 3  A juvenile's
speech within the school community, otherwise known as student speech, has
traditionally been subject to certain limitations.4 With the advent of the
Internet, however, a simple geographical definition of student speech is not so
clear.5 The pressing issue confronting schools and courts today is whether
schools have the authority to punish off-campus student Internet speech
bearing some relation to the school community.
Student Internet speech runs the gamut, from a website poking fun at an
unpopular teacher to publicly advertised gossip.6  It also includes posted
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B.A., 2007, University of Notre Dame. The author would like to thank Professor Kaplin for his
inspired advice and assistance in writing this paper; her fianc6, Matt, for his love and support
even from far away; her parents for instilling in her a love of both law and education; Bridget and
Brendan; and the gaggle for making law school so enjoyable.
1. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND
TECHNOLOGY: YOUTH ARE LEADING THE TRANSITION TO A FULLY WIRED AND MOBILE NATION
2 (2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeensTechJuly2005web.pdf. The
phrase "Internet-Savvy Students" is found in a Pew Internet and American Life Project report.
DOUGLAS LEVIN & SOUSAN ARAFEH, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE DIGITAL
DISCONNECT: THE WIDENING GAP BETWEEN INTERNET-SAVVY STUDENTS AND THEIR SCHOOLS
(2002), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPSchools-Intemet Report.pdf.
2. Press Release, Pew Internet & American Life Project, More Teens are Creating and
Sharing Material on the Internet (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.pewintemet.org/press-release.asp
?r- 150 [hereinafter More Teens].
3. See Victoria Kim, Suit Blends Internet, Free Speech, School, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008,
at B 1.
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part II.B.1.
6. See Kim, supra note 3. The article details a recent incident involving a group of middle
school girls who uploaded a video onto YouTube.com that contained a degrading gossip
conversation they had about a fellow student. Id. The school learned about the video after at
least twenty students viewed it and complained to school administrators. Id. The school
responded by suspending the student who uploaded the video, but not any of the other students
involved in the video. Id. In response, the student filed a First Amendment claim in district court
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messages encouraging people to "[s]tab someone for no reason then set them
on fire throw them off of a cliff, watch them suffer and with their last breath,
just before everything goes black, spit on their face." 7 When a school learns of
such speech, should it be permitted to take action by punishing the student, or
should the school sit back and ignore threatening speech-potentially risking
another violent school shooting?8
Legal issues concerning students' free speech rights are not new. The
Supreme Court's pronouncement of a student's right to speak freely in school
dates back to 1969, when, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, the Court declared students were entitled to wear black
armbands at school in protest of the Vietnam War, despite the school's policy
prohibiting such action.9 However "the advent of the Internet has complicated
analysis of restrictions on speech .... Indeed, Tinker's simple armband, worn
silently and brought into a Des Moines, Iowa classroom, has been replaced by
... complex multi-media web site[s], accessible to fellow students, teachers,
and the world. ''l° This 2002 statement by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recognizes that the Internet complicates the traditional student speech
analysis." Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to decide a student
Internet speech case, its recognition of the Internet's ability to alter other legal
in California. Id. An attorney who represents school districts reported that she receives multiple
queries a month from schools expressing confusion when dealing with instances of student
speech. Id. She also stated that "[tihe 'classic situation' that many school districts face
• . . is teenagers using MySpace.com from their home computers to start a negative campaign
against a fellow student, posting nasty comments, starting rumors or creating a fake profile page
for the victim to spread false information." Id.
7. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
8. See THE NAT'L SCH. SAFETY CTR., SCHOOL ASSOCIATED VIOLENT DEATHS, available
at http://www.schoolsafety.us/School-Associated-Violent-Deaths-p-6.html (providing statistics
and information on student-perpetrated homicides); see also Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist.,
494 F.3d 978, 983-84 (11 th Cir. 2007) (discussing the prevalence of school violence, especially
student-perpetrated shootings in United States schools). One example to consider regarding
school inaction is the Columbine school shootings; Eric Harris maintained a website stating "I
HATE YOU ERIC HARRIS OWNS EVERY SINGLE ONE OF YOU. The fireworks will set in
the four twenty one! Doom will become reality!" Eric's Final Online Statement?,
http://acolumbinesite.com/eric/fauxreb.html (last visited June 10, 2009) (providing a
reconstructed image of Eric Harris' website before he committed the Columbine Shootings). Had
the school discovered this before the shootings, would they have possessed the authority to act?
9. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-05, 514 (1969).
Student speech is protected under the First Amendment; therefore, students' objections to
schools' punishments are generally grounded in the First Amendment. Id. at 505; see also Kim,
supra note 3.
10. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863-64 (Pa. 2002).
11. Id.; see also Kim, supra note 3 ("[T]he Web has catapulted such fights [between
students] to a new dimension, where slander becomes far more public and can be forwarded and
reproduced in a matter of seconds.").
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standards indicates they may' be willing to consider the Internet's effect on
student speech in the future.
This Comment surveys legal issues spurred by the increasing prevalence of
off-campus student Internet speech, and addresses the various ways courts
have attempted to balance students' freedom of speech with schools' interest in
prohibiting certain types of student speech. This Comment is limited to a
discussion of student speech in public secondary schools;' 3 however, similar
issues are present in the university setting as well. 14 Further, this Comment
merely addresses the constitutionality of schools' punishment of student
speech, particularly threatening speech, and does not attempt to address the
constitutionality of any criminal action that may be taken against students.'
5
In Part I, this Comment discusses the legal precedent governing free speech
issues in schools, including Supreme Court precedent on student speech rights
and threat speech in general, as well as the developing body of case law from
lower courts specifically tackling student Internet speech. Part II describes the
approaches courts have developed to address schools' punishment of student
Internet speech, particularly by examining various analytical models for
12. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 889-92 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 595-602 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing how the
unique character of the Internet impacted the application of community standards jurisprudence to
issues arising from the Child Online Protection Act). In Reno, the Court addressed whether two
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which prohibited the transmission of
"indecent and patently offensive" Internet communications to minors, were unconstitutional.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 849. The issue, in part, led the Court to address how the Internet altered
existing practices to restrict obscene or indecent communications to youths. Id. at 849-57. In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor addressed this concern when she stated that "[b]efore today...
the Court has previously only considered laws that operated in the physical world . . . . The
electronic world is fundamentally different." Id. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This
recognition of distinct differences between the physical world and the Internet required the Court,
and particularly Justice O'Connor, to reconsider the existing free speech doctrine. Id. at 868-70
(majority opinion); id. at 886 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13. Secondary schools includes both middle and high schools.
14. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 304, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding
Temple University's anti-harassment policy unconstitutionally overbroad because it violated the
students' First Amendment free speech rights); Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 2d
571, 574, 592 (D. Del. 2008) (finding that the university did not show disruption or adverse
impact resulting from the student's articles or websites). In Murakowski, the student challenged
the university's right to discipline him for posting allegedly threatening comments on his website,
which was maintained on a school server. Murakowski, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 578. The school was
alerted to the website when the brother of a female student who lived in Murakowski's dorm filed
a complaint alleging that she felt unsafe because of statements Murakowski was posting. Id. at
578. The court addressed whether the school's punishment infringed on the student's rights,
utilizing the same standards applied in cases involving other school speech. Id. at 587-92
(finding Murakowski's comments did not constitute a "true threat" or "material disruption").
15. For an example of a student speech case concerning the criminality of the student's
speech, see United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (5th. Cir 2001), which addressed whether a
high school student's posts in an Internet chat room, threatening to kill fellow students, were "true
threats." Id. at 285, 287-88.
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potentially threatening speech. This section aims to illustrate how the Internet
alters the existing student speech standards and to demonstrate which
approaches work. Finally, Part III advocates expanding the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Morse v. Frederick16 to adopt a categorical approach to a
student's threatening Internet speech. 7 This approach would allow schools to
punish a student for such speech without infringing on his or her First
Amendment rights.18 In contrast, all other student Internet speech originating
off-campus, which fails to substantially impact the school environment, should
be presumptively considered protected speech. Such an approach is consistent
with recent state and federal legislative attempts to combat cyber-bullying,'
9
and strikes an appropriate balance between students' rights to speak freely and
schools' interests in providing a safe school environment.
I. STUDENT SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Four Seminal Supreme Court Cases on Student Speech
When the Supreme Court decided Tinker in 1969, it marked the origin of a
line of Supreme Court cases recognizing the "special characteristics of the
16. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626-29 (2007).
17. See infra Part Il.
18. This Comment, however, supports the decision in Morse. Further, it argues in favor of a
content-based regulation for speech advocating/threatening harm within the school on the premise
that violence is just as significant a problem, if not worse, than drugs. See infra Part Ill. For an
opposite view, see Joanna Narin, Note, Free Speech 4 Students? Morse v. Frederick and the
Inculcation of Values in Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 239, 242, 246 (2008). Narin
argues against extending Morse's categorical exemption for certain student speech, alleging that it
will "[o]pen[] the [d]oor to [ijnculcation [in schools] [t]hrough [c]ontent-[b]ased [r]egulation."
Id. at 246. The author contends that Morse was both contrary to prior Supreme Court reasoning
and incorrect in creating a content-based regulation of speech advocating illegal drug use. Id. at
246, 256. Further, she disagrees that schools should instill or "inculcate" values in students. Id.
at 250.
19. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. On April 2, 2009, Congresswoman Linda
Sanchez introduced to the House of Representatives the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention
Act. The law aims to make it a crime punishable by up to two years in prison to communicate
online with "the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a
person . . . ." Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111 th Cong. § 881(a)
(2009). Congresswoman Sanchez and Congressman Kenny Hulshof previously introduced a
substantially similar version of the bill in 2008. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act,
H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. (2008). Whether the bill will pass constitutional muster remains an open
question. For example, critics of the 2008 version of the bill questioned its constitutionality,
claiming it was simply an impulsive law aimed at combating indecency on the intemet. See, e.g.,
Federal Lawmaker Targets Cyber Bullying, ESCHOOL NEWS, May 27, 2008,
http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/top-news/?i=53897 (last visited Aug. 15, 2009).
1108 [Vol. 58:1105
2009] Student Internet Speech Creates New Issues in Education
school environment" as a relevant legal consideration in deciding the scope of
students' First Amendment speech rights within the school setting.20
Tinker addressed whether a school could suspend its students for violating a
school policy by wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. In an
analysis many courts would come to follow, the Court established that students
and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights ...at the schoolhouse
gate," but made clear that such rights are "applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment., 22 Tinker held that a school could
regulate student speech or expression only when it could show that the speech.
did, or reasonably could be foreseen to have "materially and substantially
disrupt[ed] the work and discipline of the school, 23 or "impinge[d] upon the
rights of other students., 24 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that the students'
speech was entirely divorced from any disruptive conduct and, therefore, the
punishment violated the students' First Amendment rights.25
Following Tinker, the Supreme Court's decisions, rather than reaffirm and
expand students' speech rights, upheld schools' punishments of student
speech. The first example came in 1986, when the Court, in Bethel School
District v. Fraser, ruled that public schools could prohibit student speech that
was vulgar, lewd, or plainly offensive because such speech was "inconsistent
with the 'fundamental values' of public school education., 27 The school in
Fraser suspended a student for delivering an assembly speech, which
contained sexual references, because the school found the speech 'obscene,'
as used in the disruptive-conduct rule . . .,,28 The majority found that the
"pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser's speech was plainly offensive to both
20. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Additionally,
Tinker represents not only the Court's first words on students' First Amendment rights, but its
most resounding statement to date. See infra Part lI.B.
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. Specifically, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the
school could punish students for such "pure speech." Id. at 505. The district court had
recognized that "the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the
type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment." Id.
22. Id. at 506.
23. Id. at 513.
24. Id. at 509. While the Court did not define a material or substantial disruption, it did
state that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the
right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508.
25. Id. at 514.
26. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also J.S. ex
rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 862 (Pa. 2002) (stating that, unlike Tinker,
these cases did not focus "on the role of First Amendment values at school," but rather
"emphasiz[ed] the importance of the educational mission of the school").
27. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
28. Id. at 678-79. The student's speech contained various mocking sexual innuendos; such
as "Jeff is the man who will go to the very end--even the climax." Id. at 687 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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teachers and students." 29  Therefore, despite the fact that no disruption had
occurred, the school's "interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar
and offensive spoken language '30 justified punishment.3'
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court
addressed whether a school could prohibit "expressive activities that.., bear
the imprimatur of the school, 32 namely censoring certain high school
newspaper articles discussing teen pregnancy and divorce. 33 Similar to Fraser,
the Court refused to apply Tinker, reasoning that the school was not merely
tolerating, but promoting student speech-something the First Amendment did
not require. 34  The majority held that "educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concems." 35  The
dissent, however, argued that the majority's holding created a "taxonomy of
school censorship" requiring Tinker to apply in one context, Fraser in another,
and Hazelwood in another. 36  This argument highlights how the Court's
subsequent cases, rather than reaffirming Tinker, merely crafted new
exceptions or categories of analysis for student speech.37
After Hazelwood, the Supreme Court remained silent on student speech until
2007, when it decided Morse v. Frederick.3 8 In Morse, the Court addressed
29. Id. at 683 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 684-85.
31. Id. at 685. But see Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007) (stating that the
"mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute"). For a more in depth discussion of Fraser's
reasoning, see Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of
Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 859-61 (2008) (stating that Fraser seemed
to rest both on the content of the speech and the forum in which it was delivered).
32. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
33. Id. at 263-64 (stating that staff members sued the school claiming a violation of their
First Amendment rights).
34. Id. at 270-71; see also Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 579 (6th Cir.
2008) (applying Hazelwood to hold that a school did not violate the student's rights when it
prohibited him from distributing candy canes with a religious card attached at a school-sponsored
activity because the school had a valid educational purpose in preventing students from being
offended by religious speech).
35. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
36. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp.
2d 571, 588 (D. Del. 2008) ("Kuhlmeier [sic]. . . 'confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the only
basis for restricting student speech."').
37. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 31, at 862 ("What might be called the
'categorization' of student speech, confirmed in Morse, is an interesting development .... [T]he
process of excluding entire categories of speech from First Amendment protection because of
their content sits uneasily beside the tendency of the Court to treat content-based restrictions of
speech as presumptively unconstitutional ...."); see also Narin, supra note 18, at 242, 246
(arguing that in Morse, the Court opted to craft another categorical exception-the promotion of
illegal drug use-and set forth new precedent for content-based regulation of student speech).
38. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
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whether a school could suspend a student for waving a banner declaring "Bong
Hits 4 Jesus" at an off-campus, school-approved activity.39 The Court framed
the issue rather uniquely, asking whether a school could restrict speech that is
"reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. ' °AO The Court refused to
apply Tinker because it reasoned that "deterring drug use by schoolchildren is
an 'important-indeed, perhaps compelling' interest, '4 1 far more important
than the mere disruption to which Tinker alluded a2  Further, reasoning that
neither Fraser nor Hazelwood applied, the Court held that the school could
regulate student seech that could "reasonably [be] viewed as promoting
illegal drug use. ' '4  Morse represents the Supreme Court's last word on the
issue, creating yet another category of student speech.44
B. The "True Threat" Doctrine
In addition to the four foundational student speech cases, the Supreme Court
has crafted certain categorical exemptions for other types of speech, which are
relevant in an analysis of student speech.45  One exemption of particular
importance is the "true threat" doctrine, which states that speech qualifying as
a "true threat" falls outside any First Amendment protection. 46  The "true
39. Id. at 2622.
40. Id. at 2625; see also Sonja R. West, Sanctionable Conduct: How the Supreme Court
Stealthily Opened the School-House Gate, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 27, 29 (2008) (discussing
how the Court in Morse failed to frame the issue as a school's authority to punish off-campus
speech). Morse also recognized that students "do not 'shed their constitutional rights . .. at the
schoolhouse gate,"' but ultimately placed greater emphasis on the schools' interest in providing a
safe environment. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627-28 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)). For example, the Court stated that "'the school setting
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily
subject."' Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)).
41. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661).
42. Id. at 2629. The Court indicated that Fraser established that the Tinker analysis is not
"absolute." Id. at 2627.
43. Id. at 2625. Adopting an entirely new standard supports the argument that the Court
applies a categorical approach to student speech. See supra note 37.
44. See Narin, supra note 18, at 242-47 (discussing how the Supreme Court's decision in
Morse was contrary to its previous student speech cases); see also West, supra note 40, at 29
(discussing the Court's decision in Morse and stating that "[t]he position that schools may
sanction a public event held on public property is unsupported by the Court's precedents").
45. See generally Sara Redfield, Threats Made, Threats Posed-School and Judicial
Analysis in Need of Redirection, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 663, 679-80 (listing types of speech
categorically exempt from the First Amendment which are relevant to student speech, including:
"[o]bscenity, child pornography, libel, fighting words, [and] incitement to violence").
46. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969); Richard V. Blystone, School
Speech v. School Safety: In the Aftermath of Violence on School Campuses Throughout This
Nation, How Should School Officials Respond to Threatening Student Expression? 2007 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 199, 205-10 (discussing the application of the "true threat" doctrine from Watts and
arguing that it should be altered to apply to the particularities of the school setting); see generally
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threat" doctrine originated in Watts v. United States, where the SuR reme Court
held that "true threats" are not constitutionally protected speech. Watts did
not concern student speech, but instead addressed whether an eighteen-year-
old could be criminally punished for allegedly threatening the life of the
president.48 The lower court upheld the punishment. On appeal the Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that his speech was not a "true threat," but rather
constitutionally protected speech. 49  Although the Court did not find that
particular speech to be a "true threat," it did create a categorical exemption for
threat speech and provided four factors to determine whether a "true threat"
exists: "the reaction of the listener, the conditional nature of the threat, the
extent to which one's speech is mere political hyperbole, and the overall
context and background circumstances of the expression."
50
The "true threat" doctrine also encompasses certain forms of non-verbal
51intimidation, as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Black. In
Black, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance banning cross-
burning with "an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons." The
Court stated:
True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals
.... [The] prohibition on true threats "protect[s] individuals from the
fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders."
53
Redfield, supra note 45, at 680-81 (2003) (discussing Watts's application in cases assessing the
constitutionally of student speech).
47. Watts, 384 U.S. at 707-08 (finding that the statement was political hyperbole and not a
"true threat").
48. Id. at 705-06. The petitioner stated, "I have already received my draft classification
.... I am not going. Ifthey ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J." Id.
49. Id. at 705-06, 708. The Court did not define a "true threat," but merely stated "[w]hat is
a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 707.
50. Blystone, supra note 46, at 204-05; see also Watts, 384 U.S. at 707-08.
51. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) ("Intimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat .... ).
52. Id. at 347-48. Specifically, the ordinance prohibited cross-burning with an "intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons." Id. at 347. The Court held that Virginia's ban on cross
burning with intent to intimidate was constitutional. Id. at 363. It also found, however, that the
provision of the ordinance stating that the burning of a cross in public view "shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate" was facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id.
at 363-64.
53. Id. at 359-60 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). The Court
also stated that intimidation could be constitutionally proscribable and defined it to mean a "type
of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or a group of persons with the intent of
placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death." Id. at 360.
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Therefore, the Court upheld Virginia's prohibition on this particular type of
intimidation. 54 This extension of the "true threat" doctrine to exempt certain
forms of intimidation from First Amendment protection provides an important
basis for schools addressing threatening speech.55
C. Threat Speech in the School Setting
The "true threat" doctrine, although crafted in the criminal context, has also
been applied in the school setting. Along with Tinker and Morse, the "true
threat" doctrine supplies the standard by which some courts judge schools'
punishment of threatening speech. 57  In a "true threat" analysis-although
there is some disagreement over whether to view the threat from the
perspective of the speaker 58 or the recipient9-courts agree that the threat
should be judged under an objective, reasonable standard.6 °
For example in Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, the school suspended a
student for threatening speech posted on his "Satan's webpage" site, which
both listed people he wished would die and encouraged violent acts.6 1 The
court applied Tinker and the "true threat" doctrine in examining whether there
was a First Amendment violation. 62 The court concluded that the school failedto meet the standard set in Tinker because there was no actual disruption and
54. Id. at 363.
55. See infra Part III (discussing how there should be a categorical rule exempting from
First Amendment protection student speech advocating violence in the school community).
56. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622-23 (8th
Cir. 2002) (discussing how there is a circuit split regarding interpretation of the "true threat"
doctrine, but also stating that "[t]he debate over the approaches appears . . . to be largely
academic because in the vast majority of cases the outcome will be the same under both tests");
see also Redfield, supra note 45, at 680-81 ("Since Watts, the Court has left the development of
true threat analysis to the circuit and state courts where the results have not been consistent.").
57. See, e.g., Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766, 768-71 (5th
Cir. 2007); Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 982, 984-85 (1 1th Cir. 2007);
Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 783-86 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing
the different circuit approaches to the "true threat" doctrine); see also Lovell ex rel. Lovell v.
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996). Other circuits following the speaker
approach include the Sixth and Tenth Circuits. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1490-91.
59. Doe, 306 F.3d at 622-23. Other circuits following the reasonable recipient approach
include the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491.
60. Compare Doe, 306 F.3d at 622 (adopting the approach "that a court must view the
relevant facts to determine 'whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude
that it expresses a determination or intent to injure presently or in the future.' (quoting United
States v. Dinwaddie, 75 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996))), with Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372-73 (forming
the question as "whether a reasonable person ... would foresee that [the listener] would interpret
[the] statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault").
61. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 781-82. Specifically, the school cited two policies as
grounds for Mahaffey's expulsion: an Internet use policy and a policy against intimidation and
threats. Id. at 782.
62. Id. at 783-86.
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the student's mere act of accessing the website at school failed to justify
punishment.63 Next, the court applied the reasonable speaker test of the "true
threat" doctrine, asking whether "'a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted . . . as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm. . .. "'64 The court concluded that the postings were not a
"true threat," because the site contained a disclaimer and there was no evidence
that Mahaffey either communicated his views to or actually threatened
anyone.65 Therefore, the court struck down the school's punishment.
66
In addition to the "true threat" analysis, two recent cases relied on Morse to
address students' threatening speech.67 In Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro
Independent School Distrist, the Fifth Circuit held student speech that
threatened a Columbine-esque shooting at the school was not protected by the
First Amendment.68 In Boim v. Fulton County School District, the Eleventh
Circuit held that an entry in a student's notebook about her desire to shoot her
teacher "was reasonably likely to further cause a material and substantial
disruption to the 'maintenance of order and decorum' within [the school]. 69
In both decisions, the courts focused on the critical and urgent problem of
school violence and reasoned that schools have a heightened interest in
ensuring a safe school environment, which justifies punishing threatening
speech.
63. Id at 784. The court distinguished the case from Bethlehem, stating there was no
disruption that "interfere[d] with the educational process." Id. at 785.
64. Id. (quoting United States v. Lineberry, 7 Fed. Appx. 520, 524 (6th Cit. 2001))
(providing an example of the reasonable speaker test).
65. Id. at 786.
66. Id.
67. Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 768-70 (5th Cir. 2007);
Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 983-84 (i1 th Cir. 2007). The rationale for both
decisions was based on the speech's threatening nature and the school's significant interest in
providing a safe school environment. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771-72; Boim, 494 F.2d at 983,985.
68. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771-72. The student in Ponce maintained an extended diary
detailing a "pseudo-Nazi" group and its plan to commit a shooting at the high school. Id. at 766.
The student told another student about his notebook and that student later informed school
officials. Id. After confronting the student about the notebook, the school seized it, read it, and
then suspended the student. Id. at 766-67. The district court held that the school failed to satisfy
Tinker and therefore the speech was protected. Id. at 767. The Fifth Circuit, rather than relying
on Tinker, extended Morse's categorical exemption for speech advocating drugs to speech
advocating harm and, therefore, upheld the school's punishment. Id. at 770-71.
69. Boim, 494 F.3d at 983.
70. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771-72 ("School administrators must be permitted to react quickly
and decisively to address a threat of physical violence against their students, without worrying
that they will have to face years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as to whether the
threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance."); Boim, 494 F.3d at 983-84; see also infra Part
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D. The Internet and Student Speech
Somewhat surprisingly, cases tackling student Internet speech date back to
1998, when a federal district court in Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-
IV School District71 held that a school could not punish a student for a personal
website developed off-campus that was merely critical of the school7 2  The
Beussink court's refusal to allow the school to punish the student was
consistent with the reasoning of many other courts; for example, the Second
Circuit held, in Thomas v. Board of Education, Granville Central School
District,73 that a school lacked authority over student speech originating
outside the schoolhouse gate. 4
Although much Internet speech does originate off-campus, even in the wake
of Beussink, courts have addressed schools' punishment of student speech on
75 76 77 7websites, e-mails, instant messages, social networking sites, 8 and even
YouTube videos.79 The courts' opinions range in approaches and outcomes. 80
Only a limited number of decisions have reached the appellate level, and those
courts have consistently upheld the schools' punishment of off-campus Internet
71. Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
72. Id. at 1177, 1181-82. In Beussink, the court viewed the website as having no
connection to the school because it was developed off-campus and did not create a disruption
within the school. Id. at 1177. The court rejected the argument that Tinker permitted the school
to regulate speech that reasonably posed a threat of disruption, because Tinker required that any
action based on a "fear or projection of such disruption" include fear that must "be 'reasonable'
and not an 'undifferentiated fear' of disturbance." Id at 1180 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). Rather, the court reasoned that the school
punished the student simply because it disliked the website's content. Id.
73. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
74. Id. at 1050, 1057-58 & n.12 (holding that the school could not punish students for a
newspaper published off-campus even though it contained allegedly "morally offensive, indecent,
and obscene" material). See generally West, supra note 40, at 29, 42-44 (arguing that the
Supreme Court's precedents have gradually expanded schools' authority over student speech).
75. Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575-79 (D. Del. 2008); Layshock ex
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591-94 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Mahaffey
ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 781-82 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Coy ex rel. Coy v.
Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794-95 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Emmett v.
Kent Sch. Dist., No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2000); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850-52 (Pa. 2002).
76. Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
77. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d
34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
78. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, *1-
2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. I1, 2008).
79. Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415,492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2007).
80. See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 866; see also Denning& Taylor, supra note 31, at 838-41.
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speech.81 Conversely, the majority of trial level decisions have found the
speech constitutionally protected.82
1. School Exigencies Win Out: Internet Cases Resulting in Favorable
Outcomes for the School
On the appellate level, only the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania have addressed student Internet speech, and both courts upheld
the schools' punishments. 83  The most recent example is Doninger ex rel.
Doninger v. Niehoff, a May 2008 decision by the Second Circuit.84 Doninger
addressed whether a school could prohibit a student from running for class
secretary because of something she posted on a private blog.85 The student's
message urged her fellow students to protest the school's rumored decision to
cancel an upcoming concert; she sent the message even after the principal had
asked her to correct the situation caused by an earlier e-mail.86 Upon being
punished for her speech, the student sued the school claiming a First
Amendment violation; 87 however, the district court held that she "failed to
show a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits." 88 The Second Circuit
81. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43, 51, 54 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d
at 40; Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 869. There are a plethora of appellate cases dealing with
threatening student speech on the Internet in the criminal context. See, e.g., United States v.
Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2001). However, criminal cases are beyond the scope of
this Comment.
82. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601
(W.D. Pa. 2007); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786, 790 (E.D.
Mich. 2002); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-
800 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (W.D. Pa.
2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000);
Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
83. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 43, 51; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40; Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at
869.
84. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44.
85. Id. at 43.
86. Id. at 45. The dispute began when the student and three other student council members
sent an e-mail from a school computer, alerting the school community that an upcoming school
concert might be cancelled. Id. After the message was sent, an influx of responsive e-mails and
calls bombarded the school, leading the administration to confront the students. Id. at 44-45.
Although school officials confronted the student to convey their disappointment and their
intention not to cancel the event, later that night, the student posted a message on livejournaLcom
from her home computer. Id. at 45. The message referred to the school administration as
"douchebags" and urged further protest. Id. Upon learning about the blog posting, the principal
prohibited the student from running for senior class secretary, concluding that, because "the
posting contained vulgar and inaccurate information," the "conduct had failed to display the
civility and good citizenship expected of class officers." Id. at 46.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id.
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affirmed, holding that the student's "post created a foreseeable risk of
substantial disruption to the work and discipline of the school. 89
The Second Circuit framed the issue as whether a school has the authority to
regulate expression that did not occur on school grounds-noting that the
Supreme Court had yet to speak on the issue. 90 The court applied a two part
test, asking (1) whether the student intended the speech to come onto campus,
and (2) whether it was foreseeable that the school would become aware of the
speech and the speech would create a disruption.9 1  The court focused
primarily on three factors in reaching its conclusion: (1) "the language ... was
not only plainly offensive, but also potentially disruptive of efforts to resolve
the ongoing controversy; ' 'g (2) the posting "was 'at best misleading and at
wors[t] false' information;" 93 and (3) the school's disciplinary action merely
prohibited the student from participation in an extracurricular activity, it did
not suspend or expel her.94 Thus, the court concluded that the student did not
have a valid First Amendment claim.
95
The Second Circuit's decision in Doninger relied heavily on its earlier
Internet speech case, Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Board of Education of
Weedsport Central School District.9 6 In Wisniewski, a middle-schooler created
and sent to some classmates, an instant messaging icon depicting a pistol firing
a bullet at his teacher's head.97 The school suspended him and permitted the
teacher who was the subject of the icon to stop teaching him.98 The student's
parents filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the school board, alleging that
the icon was protected speech under the First Amendment.99 The district court
89. Id. at 53.
90. Id. at 48. The court did not hold that the school could punish the student for vulgar and
offensive speech made from her home computer because it refused to answer whether Fraser
applied to off-campus speech. Id. at 49-50.
91. Id. at 48-50. The court applied the reasoning from Wisniewski and rejected the idea that
it extended Fraser to off-campus speech. Id. at 50.
92. Id. at 50-51.
93. Id at 51 (citation omiued).
94. Id. at 52.
95. Id. at 53 ("We are mindful that, given the posture of this case, we have no occasion to
consider whether a different, more serious consequence than disqualification from student office
would raise constitutional concerns.").
96. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d
34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
97. Id. at 36 (describing the icon, which also showed a blood splatter above the head). The
student created the icon, which he left up for three weeks, soon after the school had instructed
students that threats would not be tolerated. Id.
98. Id. The school further suspended the student for one semester; however, the district
provided alternative education. Id. at 37. The principal also alerted the police, but the police
eventually dismissed the pending criminal case, concluding that the student only meant the icon
as a joke and posed "no real threat" to any school official. Id. at 36.
99. Id. at 37.
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held that the icon "was reasonably . . . understood as a 'true threat' lacking
First Amendment protection" and therefore dismissed the claim.1
00
On appeal, rather than apply the "true threat" doctrine, 0 1 the Second Circuit
adopted a more lenient standard, concluding that "school officials have
significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the [true threat
doctrine] allows."'10 2 Accordingly, the court applied a different two pronged
analysis'0 3 and concluded that the student's speech crossed "the boundary of
protected speech and constitute[d] student conduct that pose[d] a reasonably
foreseeable risk" of disruption.'°4
The third appellate-level decision came from the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in JS. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem School District,105 where the
court upheld the school's decision to permanently expel a student for creating a
website entitled "Teachers Sux."10 6 After learning of and viewing the website,
the targeted teacher suffered stress, anxiety, and loss of sleep and eventually
left the school. 10 7 "Believing the threats to be serious," the school contacted
the police, 10 8 and suspended and initiated expulsion proceedings against the
student. 10 9 The student brought suit on First Amendment grounds.1 10 Both the
trial and intermediate courts agreed with the school, determining that the
school could punish off-campus Internet speech that caused a Tinker
disruption.' 11
100. Id.
101. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969); see also supra text accompanying
note 50.
102. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38.
103. See Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420-22 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (applying Wisniewski's framework). The two part analysis asks: (1) whether it is
reasonably foreseeable that the student's speech will reach the school campus, and (2) whether it
is reasonable foreseeable that the speech will "'materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school."' Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39 (internal citations omitted).
104. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39.
105. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
106. Id. at 851. The website contained various threatening sections, including one entitled
"Why She Should Die." The student created the website at home; however, he accessed and
showed it to other students at school. Id. at 850-52. Once other students knew of the website,
teachers quickly learned of its existence. Id. at 852.
107. Id.
108. Id. The police eventually decided not to press charges. Id. This case did not even
consider the criminality of the student's actions. Id.
109. Id. at 852-53. The student remained at school following news of the website, but the
school district eventually suspended and expelled him. Id. During the expulsion hearings, the
student's parents transferred him to an out-of-state school; therefore, he was never actually
subject to the expulsion. Id. at 853.
110. Id.
111. Id. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court framed the issue as "whether a student may be
disciplined for speech occurring off of school premises and communicated to others via the
Internet." Id.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts'
decisions.' 2 The opinion emphasized that the Internet presented novel legal
issues and discussed how neither Tinker, Fraser, nor the "true threat" doctrine
provided a sufficient framework of analysis. 13 Thus, the court applied a new
two-part framework.' 14
First, the court addressed a threshold issue of whether the speech was made
on- or off-campus 1 5 and held that "where speech that is aimed at a specific
school and/or its personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at
school by its originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech.""
' 16
Therefore, because the student accessed the website at school and aimed it at a
"specific audience of students and others connected with" the school, it was
on-campus speech for purposes of punishment." 7  Second, the court
considered other relevant factors to determine whether it was constitutionally
protected speech, including: (1) "the form of the speech;" (2) "the effect of the
speech;" (3) "the setting in which the speech is communicated;" and (4)
"whether the speech is part of a school sponsored expressive activity." 118
Based on these factors, the court held that the website created a substantial
disruption because it adversely affected the entire school community and
impacted the delivery of instruction.
119
2. Students have Free Speech: Trial Courts Generally Find the Student's
Speech is Protected
In contrast to appellate-level decisions, many lower courts that have
addressed school punishment of student Internet speech have held that the
school's punishment violated the student's free speech rights.120 The courts
112. Id. at 853, 869.
113. Id. at 859-60, 862-66. The court reasoned that the "true threat" doctrine did not apply
given the "narrowness of the exceptions to the right of free speech, and the criminal nature of a
true threat analysis." Id. at 859.
114. Id. at 864.
115. Id.
116. ld. at 865.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 864-65 ("[E]ven after this threshold consideration of the location of the speech is
established, the type of speech, the unique setting and manner in which the speech was circulated,
and the personal nature of the speech make it difficult to apply any of the three United States
Supreme Court cases above.").
119. Id. at 869 ("[T]he atmosphere of the entire school community was described as that as if
a student had died."). Similarly, Doninger, Wisniewski, and Bethlehem upheld the schools'
punishments because the "special characteristics of the school environment" necessitated that the
schools intervene to ensure a safe and civil educational environment. Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968). See discussion supra Part I.D.I.; see also
discussion infra Part I1.A. (discussing schools' duty to ensure a safe environment).
120. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601
(W.D. Pa. 2007); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791,
799-800 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454-56
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have generally applied either Tinker or Fraser in their reasoning, depending on
the forum, content, and circumstances surrounding the speech.'
In Killion v. Franklin Regional School District, the school suspended a
student for sending an e-mail containing a "Top Ten List" of offensive remarks
about his athletic director, including one that stated "[b]ecause of his extensive
gut factor the 'man' hasn't seen his own penis in over a decade."',22  The
school discovered the e-mail after a fellow student printed and distributed it at
school.
123
Addressing whether the student's First Amendment rights were violated, the
court rejected the arguments that a higher standard applied to speech made off-
campus and that Fraser124 permitted a school to prohibit offensive, lewd, or
indecent speech made off-campus. 125  Therefore, the court applied Tinker,
focusing mainly on the fact that there was no evidence of any actual or
foreseeable disruption. 126  Thus, the court held the e-mail was protected
speech.1
27
Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415128 concerned the constitutionality of
a high school senior's personal webpage, created and maintained at home,
entitled the "Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page.' 29 The website included
some "tongue-in-cheek" mock obituaries of students, which became a hot topic
at school. 13  After learning of the website from a news report-which
(W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
121. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL
4279517, at *6-8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008); Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599-601; Coy, 205 F.
Supp. 2d at 799-800; Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455; Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
122. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 448 & n.i. Specifically, the school stated that it suspended
the student because "the list contained offensive remarks about a school official [and] was found
on school grounds." Id. at 449. In addition, the school also prohibited the student from
participation in after-school sports. Id.
123. Id. The student did not physically bring the list to school because he had distributed
lists in the past and had been warned that the school would punish him if it happened again. Id. at
448.
124. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
125. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 456-57. Contra Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *8
(distinguishing and rejecting Killion's proposition that a school can never punish a student for
speech made off-campus).
126. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455. The court did, however, state that had the school
demonstrated that teachers were incapable of teaching or controlling their class, Tinker could
have been satisfied. Id.
127. Id. at 459. The court also held that the school district's "Retaliatory Policy" against
abuse of teachers and administrators was "unconstitutionally overbroad and vague." Id. at 459.
See infra Part II.D. (analyzing how courts address school policies on First Amendment grounds).
128. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
129. Id. at 1089.
130. Id. The student created the mock obituaries after completing an assignment in a creative
writing class, which had required him to write a personal obituary. Id.
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characterized the obituaries as a "hit list"-the school suspended the student,' 3 1
who then sought, and was granted, a temporary restraining order prohibiting132
the school from enforcing the suspension. The court specifically rejected
the argument that any of the standards from Tinker, Fraser, or Hazelwood
were met, and instead held that the speech was "entirely outside of the school's
supervision" and evidenced no indication of being a threat.'
33
In Coy ex rel. Coy v. Board of Education of North Canton City Schools, a
school suspended, and ultimately expelled, a student for accessing an
unauthorized website on a school computer in violation of the school district's
"Internet acceptable use policy."' 134 The court first assessed the case based on
Tinker because, although the website contained some inappropriate material, it
did not qualify as lewd, offensive, or vulgar speech as found in Fraser.135 The
court failed to find any evidence of a disruption, other than the student's access
of the website at school-which alone would not satisfy Tinker.
136
The court then proceeded to address whether the school district's policy was
constitutional under the First Amendment. 137  This analysis is sometimes
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1089-90.
133. Id. at 1090. The court stated:
Web sites can be an early indication of a student's violent inclinations, and can spread
those beliefs quickly to like-minded or susceptible people. The defendant, however, has
presented no evidence that the mock obituaries and voting on this web site were
intended to threaten anyone, did actually threaten anyone, or manifested any violent
tendencies whatsoever.
Id.
134. Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 794-95
(N.D. Ohio 2002). The website, created at the student's home, described the "exploits of a group
of skate boarders" and included profane, but not obscene material. Id.
135. Id. at 799. Similar to Killion, the court in Coy declined to apply Fraser because the
student merely accessed a personal website on a school computer and there was no evidence he
compelled other students to view it. Id. Further, the court stated that "unlike Fraser, Coy's
website, while crude, was not the 'elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor' at issue in
[Fraser]." Id.
136. Id. at 800-01. Specifically, the court determined that issues of material fact existed as
to whether the school's motivation for punishment was really based on the website's content,
which would be impermissible under Tinker, or based on the student's accessing an unapproved
site in violation of the policy. Id Therefore, the court denied summary judgment. Id.
137. Id at 801; see also Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214-
15 (3d Cir. 2001). Saxe is a Third Circuit decision written by now-Supreme Court Justice Alito
that held that a school district's "Anti-Harassment Policy" was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
at 202-03, 217. The court considered whether the policy limited itself to speech that would be
punishable under existing student speech doctrine, namely Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood. Id at
216-17. For example, the court reasoned that the policy could not rely on Fraser because it did
"not confine itself merely to vulgar or lewd speech; rather, it reache[d] any speech that interferes
or is intended to interfere with educational performance or that creates or is intended to create a
hostile environment." Id. at 216. Thus, determining that the policy allowed for punishment of
speech outside the scope of those standards, the court held that the policy violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 217. In addition, the court also held that "[t]here is no categorical
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conducted in student speech cases and includes application of both the
overbreadth and the void for vagueness doctrine. 138  The "student conduct
code" at issue in Coy contained three separate provisions.' 39 The court held
one constitutionally invalid on its face because it did not give students any
indication of what actions or behavior would be "inappropriate" and
consequently lead to discipline.1 40  The other two sections, however, passed
constitutional muster because they met the limited specificity requirement and
restricted the school's authority to on-campus behavior only.
In Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a high school
student created a parody profile of his principal from his home computer on the
popular social-networking site MySpace.com.142  The student then sent the
profile to fellow students and accessed it at school. 143  The profile quickly
gained popularity among fellow students, who followed suit by creating more
profiles of the principal.144  This led to the school expending considerable
efforts to block the website, including an eventual school-wide limit on
'harassment exception' to the First Amendment." Id. at 204. This conclusion is quite different
from now-Justice Alito's reasoning in Morse v. Frederick, where he accepted the majority's
conclusion that a school could categorically prohibit speech promoting illegal drug use. Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring). His willingness to adopt a
categorical rule in Morse but not in Saxe, could stem from his belief that a school has a more
compelling interest in deterring danger, as opposed to harassment. Id.
138. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 801. The overbreadth doctrine states that "[a] law or regulation
is overbroad under the First Amendment if it 'reaches a substantial number of impermissible
applications' relative to the law's legitimate sweep." Id. (quoting D~j Vu of Nashville, Inc. v.
Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 274 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001)). In Coy, the court found that all
three sections of the school's policy "swept up constitutionally protected speech," and therefore,
it had to determine if the policy would be "invalid under the void for vagueness doctrine." Id. at
802. A regulation is void for vagueness if it either (1) "'denies fair notice of the standard of
conduct to which a citizen is held accountable,"' or (2) "'is an unrestricted delegation of power,"'
and thereby invites arbitrary enforcement. Id. (quoting Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d
1177, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1995)); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) ("The
vagueness of [a content-based] regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its
obvious chilling effect on free speech.").
139. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
140. Id. at 802. The court concluded that section 21 of the code was a "catch-all" provision
and therefore was constitutionally invalid due to vagueness. Id at 801.
141. Id. at 803.
142. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591-92 (W.D.
Pa. 2007); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL
4279517, *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008) (addressing a student's MySpace profile parody of his
principal). The profile in Layshock stated that it was created by the principal and reported, among
other things, that the teacher smoked pot, was "too drunk to remember" his birthday, and was a
"big whore." Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
143. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
144. Id.
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computer access.14 5 The school suspended the student responsible, and also
imposed additional punishments.
1 46
The court approached the case as one of out-of-school speech being brought
on-campus. 147 In contrast to the Second Circuit's reasoning in Bethlehem, the
court found Fraser inapplicable because "[t]he mere fact that the internet may
be accessed at school does not authorize school officials to become censors of
the world-wide web.' 48 The court also found Tinker inapplicable because it
viewed the school disruption as "minimal."'149 Thus, the court determined that
the school violated the student's constitutional rights because there was not a
"causal nexus between [the student's] conduct [creating the profile] and any
substantial disruption of school operations."' 150 Unlike the court in Coy,
however, the Layshock court refused to strike down the school policy as
unconstitutional, reasoning that the overbreadth doctrine should be applied
with hesitation in schools.' 5
Finally, in contrast to prior district court decisions,152 a district court in
Pennsylvania upheld a school's punishment relating to off-campus student
speech in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.53  In Blue
Mountain, an eighth grader created a false profile, also on Myspace.com,
145. Id. at 591-93. The administration reported that the school's technology administrator
spent 25% of his time the week of December 12 dealing with profile-related issues. Id. at 593.
146. Id. at 593-94. Other punishments imposed included: placing the student in an
alternative curricular program, banning him from participation in extracurricular activities, and
prohibiting him from participation in the graduation ceremony. Id.
147. Id. at 595. The district court had previously denied the student's motion for a temporary
restraining order, concluding, under the Tinker standard, that his actions "substantially disrupted
school operations and interfered with the rights of others." Id. at 594. The court had to decide
whether to grant either party's motion for summary judgment. Id.
148. Compare id. at 597 (holding Internet access at school is insufficient to warrant
punishment by the school), with J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,
851-52 (Pa. 2002) (finding the fact that the student accessed his personal website at school
sufficient to make the speech on-campus). In Layshock, the court also stated that "the test for
school authority is not geographical" and that "[riegardless of whether the source of the school's
authority is based on timing, function, context or interference with its operations, it is incumbent
upon the school to establish that it had the authority to punish the student." Layshock, 496 F.
Supp. 2d at 598-99.
149. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 600 ("[T]he actual disruption was rather minimal-no
classes were cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, there was no violence or student
disciplinary action.").
150. Id. at 601 ("[T]he School's right to maintain an environment conducive to learning does
not trump [the student's] First Amendment right to freedom of expression ... .
151. Id. at 604-O5; see also supra notes 138 and 140.
152. See, e.g., Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 599-601; Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N.
Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800-01 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch.
Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 456-58 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
153. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, *6-
8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
2009] 1123
Catholic University Law Review
purporting to be the school principal and indicating he was a pedophile and a
sex addict.' 54 The principal discovered the profile after being informed by
teachers and receiving printed copies from students; he consequentially
suspended the student as punishment.
155
In stark contrast to the reasoning in Killion,156 the court in Blue Mountain
explicitly declined to apply Tinker's analysis.' 57 It determined that the speech
was not akin to the political speech that occurred in Tinker, but was more like
the lewd and vulgar speech in Fraser or the speech promoting illegal drugs in
Morse.158  Thus, even though the student's speech originated on a home
computer, and merely had a minor effect on the school, the court upheld the
school's punishment. 159 Accordingly, Blue Mountain provides some authority
for applying Fraser to student Internet speech originating off-campus, even
when it does not cause a substantial disruption.
II. FINDING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD: DO EXISTING STANDARDS ON FREE
SPEECH WORK IN STUDENT INTERNET SPEECH CASES?
A. Dispelling the Relevant Interests in a Student Speech Debate
Courts addressing the constitutionality of student speech employ a variety of
standards and rules. 160 All courts agree that students' rights to free speech are
154. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *1. See generally Kara D. Williams, Comment,
Public Schools vs. Myspace & Facebook: The Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U.
CIN. L. REv. 707, 726-30 (2008) (discussing the particular challenges social-networking sites
pose for student free speech problems and arguing that a specific standard should apply for
speech on social-networking sites). Like each of the other Internet cases discussed in this
Comment, this student created the profile from his home computer. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL
4279517, at * 1.
155. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *2.
156. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (stating that Fraser's rule could not be
applied to off-campus speech).
157. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *7 (noting that Tinker "is not a good fit for every
school speech situation").
158. Id. at *6. The court further stated that
while Tinker is the seminal United States Supreme Court case in this area, its standard
is not a good fit for every school speech situation. This conclusion is bolstered by the
findings of the three school free speech cases that the Supreme Court has decided since
Tinker, none of which apply the Tinker standard.
Id. at *7.
159. Id. at *6-8. Additionally, some factors the court considered in finding a sufficient nexus
between the off-campus speech and the school included the fact that the website concerned the
principal, it made its intended audience the students, it was printed and brought to school, and it
featured images taken from the school's website. Id. at *7. Further, because the court found the
discipline appropriate, it declined to strike down the school policies as unconstitutional. Id. at
*7-8.
160. See supra Part I.D. Arguably, the Supreme Court also has developed divergent
standards and rules. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d
587, 604 (W.D. Pa. 2007) ("The majority opinion in Morse identified the uncertainty as to the
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not equivalent to adults' rights to free speech.' 6' Assessing the level of
students' rights, however, poses a difficult challenge, but one that is critical in
achieving a framework for student speech analysis.
62
Students possess important constitutional rights, including the First
Amendment right to free speech. 163  Courts have stated that a student must
have the ability to offer diverse ideas, 164 be unrestrained in voicing her
opinion, 165 and not be chilled by overbroad and vague school policies and
rules166 Nevertheless, both in the First Amendment context 167 and on the
Internet, students' rights are subject to limitations. 68 One justification for this
stems from the Supreme Court's recognition that juveniles possess some
inherent differences from adults, such as a "lack of maturity and an
undeveloped sense of responsibility."' 69  Another reason-the justification
boundaries of school-speech precedents .... The five separate opinions in Morse illustrate the
plethora of approaches that may be taken in this murky area of law.").
161. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2627 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). Every Supreme Court
case addressing a student speech issue began its opinion referencing schools' interest in
regulating student speech and students' existent but limited free speech rights. Morse, 127 S. Ct.
at 2622; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266-67; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680-81, 683; Tinker, 383 U.S. at
511-13; see also Denning & Taylor, supra note 31, at 862 (stating that the one thing all the
Justices could agree on in Morse was that student speech rights did not equal adult speech rights).
162. See generally Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 1027, 1076-89 (2008) (exploring five justifications for restricting students' speech rights
and arguing that none support restricting students' speech on the Internet).
163. See Elisa Poncz, Rethinking Child Advocacy After Roper v. Simmons: "Kids are Just
Different" and "Kids are Like Adults" Advocacy Strategies, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHiCs J. 273, 279 (2008) (stating that the First Amendment applies to juveniles).
164. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 854 (Pa. 2002).
165. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181-82 (1972).
166. See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315-17 (3d Cir. 2008); Saxe ex rel. Saxe v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2000); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of
N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 802-03 (N.D. Ohio 2002); see also infra Part II.C.
167. Poncz, supra note 163, at 278. Poncz explains that "the Supreme Court has created a
patchwork jurisprudence ofjuveniles' constitutional rights." Id.
168. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-76 (1997) (recognizing a possible distinction
between Internet restrictions on patently vulgar or offensive speech for adults and for children).
169. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (stating
juveniles are inherently different from adults because they have a less developed and more
susceptible character and a higher degree of vulnerability that many times render "impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions"). In Roper, the Supreme Court held that juveniles could not
be subject to the death penalty because such punishment would be cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 568. The Court based its holding on "social science evidence that
demonstrates that kids are physically, developmentally, and socially different from adults."
Poncz, supra note 163, at 273, 274 n.4 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70).
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most frequently voiced by courts-is the "'[s]pecial [c]haracteristics' of the
[s]chool [e]nvironment." 0
While there are many "special characteristics of the school environment"
that justify restricting certain student speech, 171 the most recent language from
the Supreme Court emphasized that a school possesses an "'important-indeed,
perhaps compelling' interest" to deter students' drug use, 172  and a
responsibility to protect the physical safety of students. This language,
various legislation on school safety,' 74 and state statutes prohibiting cyber-
bullying' 75 make it clear that a school has a duty, not just an interest, to ensure
a safe school environment.' 76  Courts strive to strike a balance between
170. See Papandrea, supra note 162, at 1086. Papandrea argues there are five possible
justifications for restricting juveniles' First Amendment rights: (1) the "First Amendment
Theory," (2) the inherent "[d]ifferences [b]etween [c]hildren and [a]dults," (3) the need for
schools to provide support to parents, (4) the "'[s]pecial [c]haracteristics' of the [s]chool
[e]nvironment," and (5) the "in loco parentis doctrine." Id. at 1076, 1080, 1083-84, 1086. For
an extensive discussion of the in loco parentis doctrine and an argument in favor of making it the
sole justification for restricting students' free speech in schools, see Justice Thomas's
concurrence in Morse v. Frederick. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630-36 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring). Papandrea, however, concludes that none of the listed justifications
should permit a school to restrict students' Internet speech rights. Papandrea, supra note 162, at
1101-02.
171. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem
Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 854 (Pa. 2002) (stating that schools must offer "a laboratory-like
setting that encourages diverse thoughts").
172. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton ex rel. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
173. Id. (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito's concurrence premised the school's ability to
regulate the student's speech on the fact that "[s]peech advocating illegal drug use poses a threat
to student safety." Id Further, even Justice Stevens writing for the dissent, recognized that "the
relationship between schools and students 'is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults."' Id. at 2646 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655). Thus, all Justices agreed that schools have a
right to supervise and control students. Id
174. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301 et. seq. (2006). As codified,
it requires
states receiving funds under this chapter . . . [to] establish and implement a statewide
policy requiring that a student attending a persistently dangerous public elementary
school or secondary school ... while in or on the grounds of a public elementary school
or secondary school that the student attends, be allowed to attend a safe public
elementary school or secondary school.
Id. § 7912; see also Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the No Child Left Behind Act); Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. §§
6777, 9134 (2006), 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006) (requiring schools receiving E-rate funds to install
"technology protection measure[s]" to protect juveniles from Internet visual depictions that are
"obscene," "child pornography," or "harmful to minors")
175. See infra note 255.
176. See generally Shaheen Shariff & Leanne Johnny, Cyber-Libel and Cyber-Bullying: Can
Schools Protect Student Reputations and Free-Expression in Virtual Environments? 16 EDUC. &
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students' rights and schools' interests; therefore, when the school justifies its
punishment based on school safety, its duty to provide a safe environment will
likely outweigh the student's interest in free speech.,
77
B. The Internet: Bringing Student Speech to a School Near You
The advent of the Internet gave rise to a generation of youth completely
connected to, and dependent on, the Internet.' Youth use the Internet both as
an essential form of social interaction and as an educational tool. 179 Students'
frequent and skilled Internet use stands, many times, in stark contrast to adults'
and educators' Internet use.'80 For example, a 2002 Pew Research Center
study reported on the widening gap between "internet-savvy students" and
schools, and found that not only was Internet use more common at home, but
that students explicitly desired a more Internet-accessible and knowledgeable
school.' 8' Moreover, this generational gap is evident in certain court opinions
addressing student speech that fail to understand the particular Internet forum
in which the speech appears.' 82 Inadequately understanding the Internet forum
hinders a court from fully assessing the purpose and intended audience of the
L. J. 307, 335 (2007) (citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 643-47 (1999)) (arguing that schools are legally required to provide a safe school
environment free from harassment and bullying, and therefore if schools fail to address a
potentially disruptive situation, the school will be "creating a deliberately dangerous
environment").
177. See, e.g., Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.
2007); Boim, 494 F.3d at 983; Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent.
Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008); J.S. ex rel.
H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 861-62 (Pa. 2002).
178. LENHART et al., supra note I (finding that 87% of youth have access to and use the
Internet).
179. See Danah Boyd, Why Youth [heart] Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked
Publics in Teenage Social Life in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 137 (David
Buckingham ed., 2008); Kathleen Conn & Kevin P. Brady, Myspace and Its Relatives: the
Cyberbullying Dilemma, 226 ED. LAW REP. 1, 1-2 (2008) (listing the various types of Internet
forums youths use and providing footnotes explaining each forum); More Teens, supra note 2;
see also LEVIN AND ARAFEH, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that one of the most common activities
that youth perform online is schoolwork).
180. LEVIN & ARAFEH, supra note I, at 14 (finding that many schools and teachers have not
recognized, or responded, to new ways students communicate and access information over the
Internet). The project compiled various findings from surveys of 136 public middle and high
schools and over 200 online surveys. Id. at ii.
181. Id. at ii, 14. Considering that the study dates to 2002, there is an argument to be made
that the generation gap may have decreased. But see Boyd, supra note 179, at 137; Laura M.
Holson, Text Generation Gap: U R 2 old (JK), N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at BUI. Boyd
discusses the need to understand and promote social networking sites for teens because they
provide teens with a forum to develop their identity and status. Id. at 137-38. Further, Boyd
argues that restricting teens' participation would risk augmenting an existing generational divide.
Id. at 137.
182. See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (attempting to explain the instant messaging system).
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student's speech, both of which are relevant factors in student speech
analysis.'
83
The implications of the generational gap make clear why so many problems
arise in schools when students are punished for Internet speech and why courts
are wary of applying the free speech framework created before the advent of
the Internet. 18  Generally, however, courts base their decisions on geography,
effect, or content, and apply the standard set out in either Tinker or Fraser.
85
There has been some movement away from a traditional geography- or effect-
based approach toward a more content-focused one, which, when applied to
Internet speech, has a more promising and balanced outlook.
186
1. Geography
When the issue of students' speech rights first originated, the preliminary
analysis was much more straightforward, focusing on whether the speech
occurred on school grounds, or at a school sponsored activity so as to justifA
punishment based on the "special characteristics of the school environment.
For example, in Thomas, the Second Circuit adhered strictly to an on-
campus/off-campus delineation, and held that the school could not punish
students for speech published in an independent off-campus newspaper, even
though the speech was arguably indecent, employed some school resources,
and impacted the school community. 188 Further, in Emmett, the court refused
183. A.B. v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1223, 1224-25 (Ind. 2008) (going so far as to make the point
that the parties failed to present sufficient evidence explaining what MySpace.com was-which
was a central issue in the case); see also infra Part II.B.2. (discussing how courts consider the
intended audience of the speech to connect off-campus speech to the school).
184. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the four seminal Supreme Court cases addressing student
speech); see also DAVID HUDSON, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, STUDENT ONLINE EXPRESSION:
WHAT DO THE INTERNET AND MYSPACE MEAN FOR STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS I-
3, available at http://www.fac.org/PDF/student.intemet.speech.pdf.
185. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, *8
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d
587, 596 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp.
2d 791, 797-99 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446,
453-55 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2000).
186. See infra Part Ill.
187. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Layshock, 496 F. Supp.2d at 587; Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v.
Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Tracy Adamovich, Note, Return to Sender:
Off-Campus Student Speech Brought On-Campus By Another Student, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1087, 1087 (2008) (stating that whether a students' speech originated off campus is often a
threshold issue for courts).
188. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).
The court felt that the fact that "a few articles were transcribed on school typewriters" and the
paper was stored at the school was "de minimus" activity within the school. Id. However, in his
concurrence, Justice Newman noted that "territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in
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to allow the school to punish offensive and indecent speech on a student's
website, which was created off-campus, because the speech was "entirely
outside of the school's supervision or control."'189 A geographical distinction,
when determining a school's authority, should not be the only inquiry courts
pursue when addressing student Internet speech. 190
The Internet is slowly dispelling this simplistic "off-campus"/"on-campus"
distinction.' 9' Student speech on the Internet is more permanent and
transferable,' 9 2 and therefore, even when it originates off-campus it can impact
the school and justify punishment.' 93 Thus, some courts are now upholding
schools' decisions to punish certain student speech originating off-campus.,
94
For example, the court in Blue Mountain disagreed with the Emmett court
holding that a school could not regulate vulgar, lewd, and indecent speech on a
website created off-campus.' 95 Furthermore, the Second Circuit, in Doninger,
moved away from its earlier geography-based rationale' 96 and upheld the
school's punishment of a student for an off-campus blog posting. 97 The court
determining the limit of [a school administrator's] authority." Id. at 1058 n.13 (Newman, J.,
concurring). His statement suggests that, even in 1979, the court felt a geography-based
distinction was somewhat arbitrary. Id.
189. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090 (stating that Fraser's rule allowing a school to punish
offensive or vulgar student speech could not be applied to student off-campus speech).
190. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 (stating that when "school officials ... ventured out of the
school yard and into the general community where freedom accorded expression is at its zenith,
their actions must be evaluated by the principles that bind government officials in the public
arena"); see also Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 801 (finding that the school could not discipline a
student for his personal website absent evidence that the student's accessing the website on a
school computer disrupted the school).
191. See Shariff & Johnny, supra note 176, at 309-10 (stating that "cyberspace provides a
new frontier that allows people to repeatedly violate the rights of others" resulting in "a Pandora's
Box of legal challenges that courts need time to work out"); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 889 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The electronic world is fundamentally different.").
192. See Boyd, supra note 179, at 137-38 (discussing how youth fail to recognize that saying
something on the Internet differs from traditional gossip because it becomes semi-permanent and
public); Kim, supra note 3; see also NANCY WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS-
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL AGGRESSION, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 58
(2007) (stating that youths fail to understand the public nature of the Internet).
193. See Shariff& Johnny, supra note 176, at 309-10.
194. See, e.g., Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2008);
Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39
(2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1741 (2008); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch.
Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL 4279517, *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. l1, 2008).
195. Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *6-8. The court in Blue Mountain even upheld
the punishment of a student for her MySpace profile despite a lack of evidence of a substantial
and material disruption. Id; see supra Part I.D.2. and accompanying notes (detailing Blue
Mountain).
196. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir.
1979).
197. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49-50. For a more extensive discussion of Doninger, see supra
Part I.D. 1. and accompanying notes.
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adopted the reasoning of its earlier decision in Wisniewski that off-campus
speech can "create a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a
school. 198 In Doninger, the court's reasoning looked both at the foreseeability
of the speech reaching the school as well as the foreseeability of the speech
creating a disruption within the school. 199 Such an analysis slightly modifies
Tinker to address off-campus speech and grants schools wider authority to
regulate students' Internet speech.200
2. Effect on the School
The most consistent approach that courts employ to assess a school's
decision to punish student Internet speech is Tinker's material and substantial
disruption test.20 1 Courts generally focus on the effect, or potential effect, of
the speech, but also consider how connected the off-campus speech is to the
school environment.2°2 Tinker's easy adaptability provides courts with an
analytical structure for students' off-campus Internet speech; however, courts
struggle in defining what qualifies as a disruption, or a foreseeable risk of
disruption.20 3
For example, in Bethlehem, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania defined
material and substantial disruption as not requiring "complete chaos" and
found it satisfied when a "Teacher Sux" website "created disorder and
198. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. The court's analysis in Wisniewski could be read broadly to
have held that Fraser allowed a school to prohibit lewd, indecent, and vulgar speech made off-
campus. Id. Alternatively, it could be read narrowly to have only developed a modified-Tinker
analysis. Id. at 38-39.
199. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50. Similarly, the Wisniewski court also looked at the
foreseeabiltiy factor. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39-40; see also supra note 103. Specifically, the
Doninger court found that the student's blog posting, which encouraged other students to protest
a recent school decision, posed a .'foreseeabl[e] . . . risk of substantial disruption within the
school environment"' because it was "'purposely designed ... to come onto the campus"' and
was "offensive," "misleading," and "incendiary." Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50-51 (internal citations
omitted).
200. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (failing to
include an analysis of whether the speech would reach the school environment, but merely
looking at the risk of material or substantial disruption); see also Denning & Taylor supra note
31, at 844 ("The potential malleability of the material disruption standard renders an impact
approach potentially less speech-protective than a geographic approach.").
201. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; see also supra Part I.A. (discussing, in greater detail, the Tinker
standard).
202. See Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.
2007); Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11 th Cir. 2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864-65, 869 (Pa. 2002).
203. See Shariff& Johnny, supra note 176, at 329 ("[T]here have been mixed interpretations
regarding the application of the material and substantial disruption standard."). Additionally,
when addressing Internet speech made off-campus, courts remain undecided whether a
"heightened standard" should apply. See Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d
446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
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significantly and adversely impacted the delivery of instruction. 20 4  Other
factors that courts have found dispositive of a disruption include when the
speech: (1) affected the school's environment, 20 5 (2) forced students out of
20620
class, (3) disrupted either class or the teacher's control over the class, 0 7 (4)
affected the school computer system,20 8 (5) forced faculty to field phone calls
or miss or arrive late to class, 2 0 9 or (6) incited violence and fear among faculty
or students.210
Aside from evidence of a disruption, when the speech originates off-campus,
courts must also determine whether the speech is sufficiently connected to the
211school to justify the school's punishment. In Bethlehem, the court adopted
the rule that "where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its
personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its
originator, the speech will be considered on-campus speech. 2 12 Alternatively,
in Layshock the court looked at whether there was a sufficient "causal nexus"
204. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 868-69; see also Shariff & Johnny, supra note 176, at 329
(discussing Bethlehem and reasoning that the "public solicitation"-the student's invitation to
readers to "send $20.00 to help pay for a hit man" to kill his teacher-"towards a potentially
violent goal was enough for a judge to uphold the expulsion of the student").
205. See Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 869 (concluding that Tinker's disruption standard was
satisfied because the student's speech had caused the atmosphere of the entire school, as well as
the outside community, to be described as if"a student had died").
206. Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2008).
207. See Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (stating that because there was no showing that
teachers were incapable of controlling their class, there was insufficient evidence of a disruption).
208. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa.
2007).
209. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51.
210. See Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 369 (9th Cir. 1996)
(permitting a school to suspend a student who threatened to shoot her counselor).
211. See Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.
2007); Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984-85 (11th Cir. 2007); Cuff ex rel.
B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Each of these cases
determined that the intended audience of the students' threatening speech was an important factor
in considering the school's punishment; however, they differed in what type of intended audience
was sufficient. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770-71; Boim, 494 F.3d at 984; Cuff, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 420-
21. For example, in Ponce the court felt that only student speech that targeted the entire school
community could justify punishment. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770-71 ("The speech in question here
is not about violence aimed at specific persons . . . [for] [s]uch threats, because they are relatively
discrete in scope ... do not amount to the heightened level of harm that was the focus of...
Morse."). Conversely, in Boim and Cuff, the courts felt that it was immaterial whether a student
targeted a specific individual, or targeted the entire school community; the school could
permissibly punish the student in either case. Boim, 494 F.3d at 984; Cuff, 559 F. Supp. 2d at
420-21.
212. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002). In
Bethlehem, the court found that because the website was aimed "not at a random audience, but at
the specific audience of students and others connected with this particular School District," the
school's punishment could be upheld. Id.
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between the Internet speech and a disruption, 213 and thereby placed a higher
214burden on the school to connect the speech to the disruption. While not all
courts agree that speech merely targeting the school justifies punishment, the
majority of cases suggest that the intended audience of the speech is a relevant
factor.
3. Applying a Public Forum Analysis?
One final consideration bearing upon Internet speech concerns the
applicability of Hazelwood.216 Although no reported decision addressing
student Internet speech has been based on Hazelwood, its potential
217applicability warrants some discussion. Under Hazelwood, a school is
permitted to regulate student speech appearing in a school publication because
it is school sponsored speech and the school is not required to promote speech
that is contrary to its educational mission.2 18 Applying Hazelwood's reasoningto Internet speech, the question becomes: if a student accesses a website, blog,
213. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601. The court defined this "causal nexus" by focusing on
whether there were "gaps in the causation link between ... off-campus conduct and any material
and substantial disruption of operations in the school." Id. at 600. But see Bethlehem, 807 A.2d
at 865 (finding that a "sufficient nexus [existed] between the website and the school campus to
consider the speech as occurring on-campus").
214. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601. The court focused on the fact that in addition to the
student's Myspace.com profile, three other students also had created profiles in the same time
frame. Id. at 600. Therefore, because the school failed to demonstrate that the student's profile
specifically caused the disruption, he should not have been punished. Id.
215. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770-71; Boim, 494 F.3d at 984; Cuff, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 420-22.
But see Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(finding that the intended audience of the "Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page" was
"undoubtedly connected" to the school, but nevertheless concluding that the speech was outside
the control of the school).
216. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
217. See Shariff & Johnny, supra note 176, at 331-33 (arguing that because school
computers are school property, and the Supreme Court has emphasized that schools need not
promote speech contrary to their fundamental values, "it seems reasonable for schools to place
limitations on any form of student expression (including digital forms) that either infringes upon
the rights of others or is inconsistent with school values"). For a recent case applying Hazelwood
to a non-Internet student speech issue, see Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 577 (6th
Cir. 2008).
218. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71; see also supra Part I.A. In Hazelwood, the Court
addressed whether the public forum doctrine was applicable and stated that
school facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have 'by
policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general
public,' or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations. If the
facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, 'communicative or
otherwise,' then no public forum has been created, and school officials may impose
reasonable restrictions on the speech ....
Id. at 267 (internal citations omitted). The Court reasoned that since the school had authority and
control over the newspaper, it was not a public forum. Id. at 270. Therefore, the speech was
school sponsored, and thus subject to the school's regulation. Id.
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or e-mail on a school computer, can the school justify punishment by arguing
that the student's speech became school sponsored speech?2 19 Can the student,
in response, argue that the school computer was a public forum and therefore
his speech was protected?
While no case has specifically addressed either issue, courts have considered
a student's utilization of a school computer in other analyses. 22  For example,
in Layshock the court found that merely accessing a website at school was
insufficient to create a substantial disruption. 221 However, in Bethlehem, the
court concluded that the student's speech could be considered on-campus
222because he accessed it at school. Hazelwood's applicability is limited to a
small subset of cases in which a court concludes that the speech was school
22sponsored. 23 Therefore, it seems unlikely that Hazelwood will warrant much
application in Internet speech cases because most Internet speech occurs
outside the school, and merely accessing speech on a school computer should
not make the speech school sponsored. 22
C. Threat Speech: What Standard Applies?
Apart from the traditional geography- and effect-based approaches to
Internet speech, courts sometimes apply a different standard for threatening
speech. Considering that student Internet speech can commonly be
threatening, distinguishing courts' various methods of analysis is particularly
relevant.
First, some courts treat students' threatening speech like any other student
226speech and apply Tinker's disruption standard. For example, the Second
219. See Shariff & Johnny, supra note 176, at 331-34 (arguing that when students use
school-owned computers, that speech becomes school property and is subject to extensive school
regulation based on Hazelwood and other Supreme Court precedent). But see Layshock, 496 F.
Supp. 2d at 597 ("The mere fact that that the internet may be accessed at school does not
authorize school officials to become censors of the world-wide web.").
220. See Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 597; J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002).
221. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 597. See generally Rosann DiPietro, Constitutional
Limitations on a Public School's Authority to Punish Student Internet Speech, 12 J. INTERNET L.
3, 8 (2008) (discussing various issues resulting from student Internet speech, including the
Layshock case).
222. Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 869.
223. See supra note 218.
224. Cf supra note 219. Further, given that many schools have Interet use policies that
restrict students' access to certain websites, situations in which students are creating or accessing
websites on school computers will likely be less frequent. See Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d
677, 682 n.5 (W.D. Va. 2000) (discussing a particular school Internet filtering system that
"provide[s] protection against inappropriate student and staff exposure to the Internet").
225. See, e.g., Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir.
2007); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 784-85 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
226. See, e.g., Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Sch. Dist., 494
F.3d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008).
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Circuit in Wisniewski applied a Tinker based rationale to the student's Internet
depiction of a pistol firing a bullet at his teacher's head and concluded that it
227
was not First Amendment protected speech. The court stated that "there can
be no doubt that the icon . . . would forseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment. ' 228 Additionally, in Mahaffey, the
court applied Tinker to a student's "Satan's webpage," which encouraged
readers to kill people and listed various people the student wished would die.2
29
There, however, the court concluded that there was no showing of an actual
disruption and held that the school's punishment violated the student's
rights.
230
Alternatively, other courts apply a "true threat" analysis and thus consider
whether the student's speech falls entirely outside the protection of the First
Amendment, as opposed to considering whether the mere special
characteristics of the school environment justify punishment.2 3' Because the
"true threat" doctrine originated in the criminal context, it requires the school
to meet a much higher burden.232 For example, the court in Mahaffey also
considered whether the speech constituted a "true threat." 233 It determined that
the website was not a "true threat" because there was no evidence that the
student communicated or intended to communicate the website to anyone, nor
23
was it specifically threatening a particular individual. 4 Therefore, to provethe student's speech was a "true threat," a school must provide some evidence
227. Id.; see also Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying the same reasoning to a fifth-grade student's drawing of an astronaut
saying he would "blow up the school with all the teachers in it").
228. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40.
229. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 781, 782, 784.
230. Id. at 786. Specifically, the court concluded that there was no showing of an actual
disruption because the student created the website off-campus and the website did not interfere
with the school. Id. The court failed to address, though, the foreseeability prong of Tinker;
therefore, the court may have upheld the school's punishment if it had considered this prong. See
id. at 784-85 ("[T]he evidence simply does not establish that any of the complained of conduct
occurred on [school] property .... [T]here is no evidence that the website interfered with the
work of the school ... [and] [tihere is no such evidence of disruption on the record before this
Court.").
231. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626 (8th
Cir. 2002); Lovell ex ret. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).
232. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38 (stating that the First Amendment gives school officials
"significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the Watts standard allows"); see
also supra note 113.
233. Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 786.
234. Id.; see also Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 574-75, 590-91 (D.
Del. 2008) (considering whether a university had the right to punish a student for "posting
allegedly threatening comments on a website maintained on the University's server," and
concluding that the "true threat" standard was not satisfied).
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demonstrating that the student intended and was capable of communicating a
threat . 35
Finally, the most recent approach to students' threatening speech originates
from cases addressing non-Internet off-campus speech.2 36 This approach
creates an almost categorical exemption for student speech which is reasonably
perceived as advocating or threatening school violence.237  While such
reasoning originated before Morse, it has since gained momentum and
legitimacy.
238
In Ponce, the Fifth Circuit adopted the rule that "speech advocating a harm
that is demonstrably grave and that derives that gravity from the 'special
danger' to the physical safety of students arising from school environment is
unprotected. The court developed this rule by reading Morse as
establishing a "content-based regulation" of student speech promoting illegal
drug use, and extended that rule to student speech "advocating harm.
'24°
The rule established by Ponce is buttressed by the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Boim. 24 1 The court stated "there also is no First Amendment right
allowing a student to knowingly make comments, whether oral or written, that
reasonably could be perceived as a threat of school violence, whether general
or specific, while on school property during the school day., 24 2 Further, the
Boim court, through its reliance on Tinker's disruption standard and its
extensive discussion of the problem of school violence, demonstrated
implicitly that it primarily based its holding on the threatening content of the
235. See Mahaffey, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 786; see also supra note 60 (discussing two cases
applying the "true threat" doctrine to the school setting).
236. Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007). The
fact that Ponce did not address Internet speech does not render the decision inapplicable for
several reasons. Id. at 770. First, student speech in a written diary is sufficiently similar to
student speech on a blog or other Internet site such as livejournal.com. Id. at 766; see Doninger
ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2008) (dealing with a student's blog
posting on livejoumal.com). Second, the speech in Ponce originated off-campus and the school
learned of it from a fellow student. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766; see also Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
237. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 765, 769-70; see also Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494
F.3d 978, 983-84 (11 th Cir. 2007) (making a similar argument based on Morse).
238. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 768, 770-71; see also Redfield, supra note 45, at 719-20 (arguing
that an implicit reading of LaVine v. Blaine School District, 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001),
supports the argument that "speech that poses a threat of violence" could become part of the list
of categories of speech schools could permissibly prohibit).
239. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770; see also supra note 68 (discussing the facts of Ponce in greater
detail).
240. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770. Ponce discussed Morse at length, and stated that Justice Alito's
"concurring opinion therefore makes explicit that which remains latent in the majority opinion:
speech advocating a harm that is demonstrably grave and that derives that gravity from the
'special danger' to the physical safety of students arising from the school environment is
unprotected." id.
241. Boim, 494 F.3d at 984.
242. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 69.
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243
speech. Therefore, Ponce and Boim open the door to arguments that the
Supreme Court would accept a content-based regulation of significantly
threatening student speech.
D. Speech Codes: Walking a Thin Line Between Protecting Students and
Violating the First Amendment
The final issue relevant to student Internet speech is whether a court should
strike down a school's entire speech or conduct policy, or simply the school's
individual disciplinary action, on First Amendment grounds. Arguments
against school policies are premised on the overbreadth or void for vagueness
doctrines. 245 The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, but has held
that "[g]iven the school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a
wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the
school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code. 246
Decisions such as Layshock demonstrate that many courts, even when striking
down the school's individual disciplinary action, refuse to do the same for the
school policy.247 In Coy and Killion, however, courts showed a willingness to
strike down a school's policy on First Amendment grounds.
248
The most critical factor bearing on a court's willingness to strike down a
school policy appeared to be whether it contained a geographical limitation.
249
For example, in Killion the court held the school's "Retaliatory Policy" against
243. Boirn, 494 F.3d at 983-85. For example, the court discussed the prevalence of school
shootings, and cited the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 as legislation compelling schools to
take school safety more seriously. Id. at 984. Further, the court stated that Morse's rationale
"applies equally, if not more strongly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat of school
violence." Id.
244. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314-20 (3d Cir. 2008) (addressing
university students' speech); Saxe ex rel. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217
(3d Cir. 2001); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Canton City Sch., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791,
802-03 (N.D. Ohio 2002). See generally WILLARD, supra note 192, at IIl (discussing the
constitutionality of anti-bullying and anti-harassment policies as a pertinent legal consideration
for schools).
245. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 313; see also supra note 138 (discussing the overbreadth and void
for vagueness doctrines in the school setting).
246. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986); see also DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 313
("[T]he Supreme Court's resolution of student free speech cases has been, to this point in time,
without reference to the overbreadth doctrine.").
247. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604-05 (W.D.
Pa. 2007) (stressing that the overbreadth doctrine warrants more hesitant application in the school
setting); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv585, 2008 WL
4279517, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2008).
248. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 802; Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446,
459 (W.D. Pa. 2001); see also DeJohn, 573 F.3d at 320 (striking down Temple University's
sexual harassment policy because it violated a student's First Amendment free speech rights);
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
249. See, e.g., Blue Mountain, 2008 WL 4279517, at *8; Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 802;
Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 459.
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abuse of teachers overly broad because it failed to define "abuse" and failed to
limit the school's authority strictly to school grounds. 250 Further, in Coy, the
court struck down the speech code's "catch-all" policy because it was not
specific enough and failed to include a geographical limitation.25'
A court's willingness to strike down a school policy lacking a geographical
distinction stands in stark contrast to its willingness to uphold punishments of
off-campus speech, as well as recent cyber-bulling legislation.252 Currently
253thirteen states have enacted cyber-bullying statutes, at least six states are
considering enactment of such statutes, and a proposal to enact a federal
cyberbullying statute is currently pending in Congress. 254 Of the thirteen laws
in place, five permit schools to punish students for incidents of cyber-bullying
that occur off school grounds. 255 For example, Delaware's School Bullying
Prevention Act of 2007 states that "[t]he physical location or time of access of
a technology-related incident is not a valid defense in any disciplinary action
by the school district ... provided there is a sufficient school nexus."2 56 The
250. Killion, 136 F. Supp. at 458-59. The court also found that the school failed to provide
any evidence of how the policy had actually been applied. Id.
251. Coy, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 802.
252. See Doninger ex rel. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski
ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1741 (2008); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847,
850 (Pa. 2002). For a more in depth discussion of the recent surge of cyber-bullying legislation,
see Katherine Fitzgerald, Bullying 2.0: Dramatic Cases Have Legislators Concerned About
Online Harassment, but Civil Libertarians Worry New Laws Might End Up Picking on Free
Speech, STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER REPORT, Spring 2008, at 28, available at https://www.
splc.org/report detail.asp?id= I 426&edition=45; see also Bully Police USA, http://www.bully
police.org (last visited June 10, 2009) (providing evaluative information on state statutes
governing bullying and cyber-bullying).
253. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-917A (2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
8256 (2007); Mich. HB-4162 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.0695 (West 2008); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 79-2,137 (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
339.351 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.6 (2009);
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.285 (2008).
254. See Fitzgerald, supra note 252, at 28-29 (noting that Maryland, Missouri, New York,
Rhode Island, Florida, and Utah are considering cyber-bullying legislation).
255. Arkansas, Delaware, and New Jersey explicitly state that schools have the authority to
punish cyber-bullying originating off-campus. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2008). Idaho's and
Minnesota's legislation does not discuss any geographical restriction on the school's jurisdiction.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917 (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.0695 (West 2008). However,
Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Oregon all limit the school's authority to speech
occurring within the school campus or at a school sponsored event. IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28
(West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-2,137 (2008); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.351 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120 (2008). For discussion of the
proposed federal legislation, see supra note 19.
256. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2007). Additionally, a 2007 law in Arkansas added
cyber-bulling to its school anti-bullying policies and included a provision that allows schools to
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growing popularity of these statutes indicates a trend among state legislatures
to expand the authority of schools to certain off-campus student speech.257
III. A CATEGORICAL APPROACH FOR THREATENING INTERNET SPEECH
The Supreme Court has yet to address the pressing issue of student Internet
speech originating off-campus.25 8  Therefore, defining the appropriate
authority schools have to punish certain student Intemet speech is an important
task.259
An appropriate analysis for student Internet speech should begin with the
presumption that off-campus Intemet speech is protected, except in rare
circumstances. 26  Students' off-campus Internet speech normally does not
implicate the "special characteristics of the school environment. ''2 6 1 In certain
circumstances, however, either because of its content or its effect, off-campus
262Internet speech can dramatically impact the school.
Where student Internet speech originating off-campus impacts the school
community an analysis of the permissibility of that speech should begin by
asking whether it advocates violence within the school community. 263 Such an
take action against "an electronic act that results in the substantial disruption of the orderly
operation of the school or educational environment" and therefore is not limited to cyber-bullying
that originates on school grounds. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2007).
257. See supra note 255.
258. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007) (addressing the issue of
speech promoting an illegal activity). The Court could have framed the issue as whether a school
had the authority to punish student speech made off-campus, because the speech in this case
occurred at a public rally. Id. at 2622, 2624-25; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
However, the court declined to address that issue and instead framed a very narrow issue: whether
schools could punish students for speech reasonably seen as promoting drugs. Morse, 127 S. Ct.
at 2625.
259. See generally DiPietro, supra note 221, at 3 (discussing how the Internet poses difficult
jurisdictional issues for schools). If student Internet speech originated on-campus, such as on a
school computer, the school could easily apply Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse because
each case permits schools to punish certain student speech occurring within the school
environment. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
272-73 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969). Therefore, the more difficult issue is
determining when schools are warranted in punishing student Internet speech that originates off-
campus.
260. See supra Part I1.A. (discussing how the "special characteristics of the school
environment" justify a school's authority to limit student speech).
261. Id.
262. See supra Part lI.B. This Comment argues that a categorical approach to Internet
speech, like the one adopted in Morse and Ponce, will strike an appropriate balance between
students' right to free speech and the school's interest in promoting a safe environment. Id.; see
also Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2625; Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765,
770-71 (5th Cir. 2007).
263. See Redfield, supra note 45, at 719-20. Redfield briefly discussed the possibility of
categorizing and prohibiting speech that poses a threat. Id. at 719. However, the article was
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inquiry would be similar to that in Ponce because it would strictly examine the
form and subject matter of the speech to determine whether it poses a threat of
violence or harm to the school community; if so, punishment would be
appropriate. 264  Second, the analysis should determine whether the speech
,,265qualifies as a "true threat. This portion of the analysis should focus on both
266the context of the speech and the intent of the speaker. If the speech falls
into either category-advocating or threatening harm-it should be
categorically exempt from First Amendment protection in the school setting.
If, however, the speech does not have threatening content, then the court
should conduct the traditional fact-based analysis articulated in Tinker.16 ' This
framework recognizes that the "special characteristics" of schools requiring a
safe environment should outweigh students' rights to speak freely.
268
It may be true that employing such a categorical distinction would be
impractical because it is difficult to differentiate between threatening and non-
threatening speech.269 As demonstrated in Boim and Ponce, however, adopting
such a distinction is both permissible and necessary. 27° As the court stated in
Ponce, "[i]f school administrators are permitted to prohibit student speech that
advocates illegal drug use ... then it defies logical extrapolation to hold school
administrators to a stricter standard with respect to speech that gravely and
uniquely threatens violence."
271
In distinguishing Interet speech, which threatens or advocates violence in
the school, courts and schools should consider the content, intent of the
written before Morse v. Frederick and subsequent cases that address expanding the rule to
threatening speech. 1d; see also Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770-71; Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist.,
494 F.3d 978, 984 (11 th Cir. 2007). Further, this Comment expands beyond merely advocating a
content-based regulation of threatening speech by providing a method to distinguish between
threatening and non-threatening speech, and by limiting the rule to Internet speech in particular.
264. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770-71; Boim, 494 F.3d at 984. Ponce formulated the rule to
allow for punishment of student speech advocating "demonstrably grave" harm related to the
school environment. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770. An alternative formulation of the rule would
exclude speech that reasonably poses a significant threat of violence.
265. See supra Part 1.B.-C.
266. Id; see also text accompanying notes 233-34.
267. See supra Parts I.D., I.B.
268. See supra Part NI.A.
269. See WILLARD, supra note 192, at 129-31 (recognizing that schools are not always
capable of distinguishing between legitimate threats and non-legitimate threats).
270. Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (finding that the "same rationale
[as in Morse] applies equally, if not more strongly, to speech reasonably construed as a threat of
school violence"); see also Ponce ex rel. E.P. v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 770-71
("[T]he difficulty of identifying warning signs in the various instances of school shootings across
the country is intrinsic to the harm itself.... School administrators must be permitted to react
quickly and decisively ... without worrying that they will have to face years of litigation second-
guessing their judgment as to whether the threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance.").
271. Ponce, 508 F.3dat 771-72.
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speaker, and form of the Internet speech. An assessment of content and
intent should be similar to a "true threat" analysis, except that it should provide
schools with greater leeway, accounting for the school environment, rather
than the criminal context. Further, the court must take into account the
school's perspective, as well as its "compelling interest" in promoting student
safety274 For example, certain contextual facts such as the target of the speech
and the identity of the speaker should impact whether the punishment was
appropriate. 275 Such factors are of particular importance in the cyber-bullying
context-one of the most pervasive forms of Internet speech that schools must
confront.27 6
Assessing the form of the Internet speech would determine whether the
speech arose in an e-mail, personal website, social networking site, blog, or
instant message. 277  The speech's form provides insight into the intended
audience of the speech, which is a relevant factor in a court's analysis.2
78
Additionally, evaluating the speech's form would aid a school in conducting a. .... 1 79
Tinker inquiry to determine how potentially disruptive the speech would be.
For example, Internet speech posted on a private website was likely never
intended to reach the school community. 280 On the other hand, speech in e-
272. See supra text accompanying note 11 8 (articulating the factors considered by the court
in Bethlehem).
273. See supra note 15.
274. See Boim, 494 F.3d at 983-84 (discussing the prevalence of school violence and the
school's strong interest in punishing speech advocating school violence).
275. See Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089-90 (W.D. Wash.
2000) (failing to consider that the student had no past disciplinary record and did not intend to
threaten anyone before affirming his punishment for allegedly threatenin Internet speech). In
Emmett, the school discovered a student's website through an exaggerated news report, which
claimed that the student was posting a "hit list." Id. at 1089. The student did not have a prior
disciplinary history and had created the so-called hit list as obituaries in a "tongue-in-cheek" after
he and his classmates wrote their own mock obituaries in a creative writing class. Id. Had the
school considered the entire context of the student's website, as well as the identity of the student,
it is likely the school would have determined that the threat was not legitimate and therefore not
worthy of punishment.
276. See generally WILLARD, supra note 192 (examining the extensive problem of cyber-
bullying).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79 (discussing the variety of Internet forums in
which student speech has appeared).
278. See supra Part II.B.2.
279. See supra Part II.B.2. This issue will arise most frequently when the school fails to
demonstrate an actual disruption, and instead justifies its punishment on a reasonable
foreseeability that a disruption would occur. Id.
280. See generally WILLARD, supra note 192, at 137 (arguing that schools should
characterize student speech that is critical of the school as a "[t]eachable [m]oment," enabling
teachers and schools to learn from the students' comments). Thus, student speech on private
websites that is merely critical of the school should be outside the school's jurisdiction to punish.
See, e.g., Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (stating that a school could not punish a student for his website simply because it
disliked his criticism of the school).
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mails, instant messages, or blogs is targeted at a specific audience and, as a
result, invites outside responses. 281 This type of Internet speech arguably poses
a greater threat of disruption to the school environment. In conclusion,
conducting the three-part inquiry discussed-guided by assessing the factors of
content, intent, and form--courts and schools should be better equipped to
tackle problems arising from student Internet speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Intemet has radically changed student speech issues by challenging the
282previously accepted geographical definition of student speech. Although in
the past, student speech made off-campus remained outside the schoolhouse
gate, when it is posted on the Internet, the speech is placed in the public realm
and is potentially disruptive to the school environment. While not all student
speech made off-campus implicates the school, certain types of speech, such as
that advocating illegal drug use, creating a substantial disruption, or advocating
or threatening harm to the school community should be subject to school
punishment.
Recognizing a geographical definition of student speech is no longer
adequate, and attempting to formulate a new definition is problematic.
Defining student speech requires balancing students' sacred and important free
speech rights with schools' duty to ensure a safe and civil school environment.
Determining a simple, clear definition will likely never be possible, but
dispelling certain rules and guidelines will aid schools in navigating both the
difficult waters of student speech and snap decisions based on a "very tricky
calculus.
'283
281. See Boyd, supra note 179, at 137.
282. See supra Part ll.B.1.
283. Kim, supra note 3 (quoting Tom Hutton, legal counsel for the National School Boards
Association).
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